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An Essay On Compulsion and Delegation By Allamah Tabatabai The sentence, "but He does not cause to err by it (any) except the transgressors (Q 2:26)", explains how Allah manages the actions of His servants. Does He compel them to act in a pre‑determined way? Or, has He delegated to them all powers in this respect? It is better to solve this knotty problem here and now, by the guidance of the Qur'an. Allah says:
These and other similar verses prove that to Allah belongs the whole universe; His ownership is unconditional and unlimited. A man owns a thing, let us say, a donkey; he may use it and take its advantage to a certain extent only. For example, he may ride it or use it as a beast of burden; but he cannot starve it to death, nor can he burn it alive. Why? Because his ownership is not absolute; society would condemn him if he were to commit such atrocities. His ownership allows him certain advantages only, and not every possible use. But when we say that Allah is the Owner of the worlds, we mean absolute, real and unrestricted ownership. There is no owner except Allah; the things own, or control, for themselves neither any harm nor any profit, neither life, death no resurrection. It is only Allah who owns and controls every affair of every creature; He may do with them whatever He pleases; no one can ask Him why; He cannot be blamed or questioned for anything He does, because He is the absolute Owner. He has, of course, allowed some of His creatures to use some other things to a certain limit; but both the user and the used are His property; and the user cannot exceed the authorized limit. Allah, as the absolute Owner, cannot be questioned about His dispositions; but others have to give account of how they exercised their authority. Allah says:
Allah disposes and manages His property in any way He pleases; no one can use any other thing except with His permission, because He is the real Owner and Sustainer of every thing. Now we come to the rules and laws which Allah ordains for His creatures. He uses the same method which has been adopted by the human society ‑ ordaining what is good and praising and rewarding its doers; forbidding what is bad and condemning and punishing its doers. For example, He says:
Obviously, the laws ordained by Allah look at the good of man, and Allah at perfecting the human society. Allah says:
There are many such verses; and they show that the principles which the laws are based upon are always the same ‑ be it a divine commandment or a human legislation. What is good in itself and ensures the good of the society is allowed, enjoined and prescribed; and what is evil in itself and endangers the social structure is forbidden; man is praised and rewarded for doing the former, and blamed and punished for doing the later. Some of those principles are as follows: People do whatever they do because of its underlying wisdom and good. Legislation of laws is no exception to this rule; the laws too are made because of their underlying good and benefit. They reward the law‑abiding citizens and chastise, if they so wish, the law‑breakers. The said recompense must be correlated to the action done ‑ in its quantity and quality. Also, it is accepted that the enjoinment and prohibition can be addressed to him only who is not under any duress or compulsion who has got freedom of will and choice. The above‑mentioned recompense too is related to such actions only which emanate from free will and choice. Of course, if someone, by his own action, puts himself in a tight comer, in a difficult position where he has to transgress a law, he may be justly punished for that transgression, and his plea of helplessness will not be heeded at all. Allah uses these same principles in His dealing with His creatures. He does not compel the man to obey or to disobey the divine commands. Had there been any compulsion, rewarding the obedient ones with the paradise and punishing the disobedient ones with the hell would have been absolutely wrong: the reward would have been an‑unprincipled venture, and the punishment an unmitigated oppression and injustice ‑ and all of it is evil according to reason.. Moreover, it would mean favoring one against the other without any justification, without any cause and this too is a demerit according to reason. Furthermore, it would provide the aggrieved party with a valid argument against Allah but Allah says:
The above discourse makes the following points clear: First: Divine laws are not based on compulsion. These rules have been made for the good of man in this life and the hereafter. And they have been prescribed for him because he has freedom of will, he may obey the rule if he so wishes, and may disobey if he so chooses. He will be fully recompensed for whatever good or bad he does by his free will. Second: There are things and actions which are not in conformity with the divine sanctity, yet the Qur'an attributes them to Allah, like misleading, deceiving, scheming against someone, leaving him wandering on in his rebellion, letting the Satan overpower the man and become his associate. All these actions are related to various kinds of misleading and misguidance. But Allah is above defects and demerits, and, therefore, these words when attributed to Him, should convey a meaning in keeping with His sacred name. Initial misleading, even in the sense of making inattentive and forgetful, cannot be ascribed to Allah. What the above‑mentioned expressions actually mean is this: When someone by his own free will, opts to go astray, chooses the wrong path and commits sins, then Allah leaves him in that straying, and, thus, increases his error ‑ it is done as a punishment of his wrong choice. Allah says: He causes many to err by it and many He leads aright, by it, but He does not cause to err by it (any) except the transgressors (Qur'an 2:26)
Third: The divine decree does not cover the actions of the man inasmuch as they are attributed to him ‑ they are done by the doer, although not created by him. We shall further explain it later. Fourth: Now that it has been seen that the divine law is not based on compulsion, it should be clearly understood that it is not based on delegation of power either. How can a "master" issue an authoritative command if he has delegated all his powers to the servant. In other words, this theory of delegation negates the comprehensive ownership of Allah vis‑a‑vis many of His possessions. TRADITIONS It is reported in 'Uyunu l‑akhbar, through several chains: When the Leader of the faithful, 'Ali ibn Abi Talib returned from Siffin, an old man (who has participated in that battle) stood up and said: "O Leader of the faithful! Tell us about this journey of ours, was it by Allah's decree and measure?" The Leader of the faithful said: "Yes, O Shaykh! By Allah you did not ascend any elevation, nor did you descend to any valley but by a decree of Allah and by His measure." The old man, thereupon said: "I leave to Allah all my troubles (of this journey), O Leader of the faithful! (Imam 'Ali ‑ replied: "Have patience, O Shaykh! Perhaps you take it to mean a firm decree and a compulsory measure! If it were so, then there would be no justification of reward or punishment, no sense of command, prohibition or admonition, no meaning of promise or threat; there would not be any blame on an evil‑doer nor any praise for a good‑doer. Nay, the good‑doer would have been rather more deserving of blame than the evil‑doer, and the evil‑doer rather more worthy of grace than the good‑doer. (Beware!) this is the belief of the idol worshippers and the enemies of the Beneficent God (who are) the Qadariyyah of this ummah and its Majus. O Shaykh! Verily Allah ordained (the shari'ah) giving freedom of will (to men) and prohibited (evil) to keep us on guard; and He gave plentiful (reward) on meager (deeds); and He was not disobeyed by being overpowered, nor was He obeyed by compulsion; and He did not create the heavens and the earth and what is between them in vain; that is the opinion of those who disbelieve on account of the fire." The topics of the speech of Allah and His decree and measure were among the earliest about which the Muslims differed among themselves. This second dispute may be described as follows: The eternal divine will govern every thing in the universe. These things are transient in their quiddity; but when they do exist, they do so because the will of Allah decreed their existence ‑ and in this way their existence becomes essential ‑ otherwise, the divine decree would be meaningless. Conversely, when a thing does not exist, it is because Allah did not decree its existence and in this way its existence becomes impossible ‑ otherwise, the divine will would be meaningless. In short, whatever exists, exists because Allah has decreed its existence, thus turning it into an essential being. This. principle applies everywhere. But the difficulty arises when it comes to such a human action that issues from our own will and choice. We know that we can do it if we so desire, and can ignore it if we so wish. Their doing and not doing is equally possible to us. The balance is tipped in favor of either side by our own will and choice. Our actions are based on our choice, and our will brings them into existence. The difficulty that arises at this point is this: We have earlier seen that nothing comes into being without the will and decree of Allah, which turns the thing into an essential being ‑ if so, then how can any action of ours be termed as "possible" one? It must exist because the divine will has decreed it! Moreover, how can our will affect it in any way when it is governed by the will of Allah? Also, in this background, it cannot be said that man had power to do a certain work before he did it. And, because he did not have that power, Allah could not give him any order or command for or against that work. Going a step further, if Allah gave him an order and he did not comply, it would mean that Allah Himself had not wanted that thing to happen; so it was impossible for it to happen. Then the question would arise. How could Allah order him to perform an impossible task? Conversely, if someone complied with that order, it was because Allah Himself wanted it to happen. Then why should the man be rewarded without any valid reason? By the same reasoning, a sinner should not be punished, as it would be against justice, a naked oppression. One may go on enumerating the difficulties arising out of this subject. A large number of Muslims felt obliged to admit, and believe in, all these absurdities. They said that: Man does not have power to do a work before the time comes to do it. The reason has nothing to do with the merit or demerit of any action. Whatever Allah does becomes good; and whatever He forbids becomes evil. Accordingly, Allah may choose an action without any justification; He may give reward without any cause; He may ordain laws beyond the capacity of the doer or agent; He may inflict punishment on a disobedient servant even though the said disobedience and transgression was not of his doing. It appears that the old man, who had asked the question, thought that the belief in the divine will and decree meant that there was no merit or demerit in any action and that man had no right of any reward (or punishment). Naturally he was disappointed when he heard that the journey was by the decree of Allah; that is why he said: "I leave to Allah all my troubles." What he meant was this: My journey to Siffin and back and my fighting in the way of Allah had no benefit for me as it was governed and done by the will of Allah; my share in all this venture was only the trouble and the inconvenience which I underwent. Therefore, I shall leave it to Allah to balance my account, as it was He Who put me through all these troubles. The Imam ('Ali) replied to him by saying, "If it were so, there would be no justification of reward or punishment. . ." The Imam pointed to the rational principle on which the legislation is based. And at the end he reasoned that Allah did not create the heavens and the earth and what is between them in vain. If Allah could will the man's actions in a way as to deprive him of his freedom of will and choice, it would mean that He could do things without any purpose and aim; then He could create the whole creation aimlessly and in vain. This in its turn would render the principle of resurrection and reward and punishment invalid too. It is narrated in at‑Tawhid and 'Uyunu 'I‑akhbar that Imam ar‑Rida was asked about compulsion and delegation, and he said: "Should I not teach you in this regard a principle by which you shall never differ (among yourselves), and no one will argue with you on this subject but that you shall defeat him (by it)?" We said: "(Teach it to us) if you so please." Thereupon he said: "Verily Allah is not obeyed through compulsion, nor is He disobeyed by overpowering; and He did not leave the servants remiss in His kingdom; He (still) owns what He has given into their possession, and has power on what He has put into their power. Now, if the servants decided to obey Him, He would not prevent them from it, nor would he put any obstruction to it; and if they decided to disobey Him, then if He pleased to bar their way to it He would do so, and if He did not hinder it and they committed it, then it was not He Who led them into that (sin)." Then the Imam said: "Whoever would accurately delineate the boundaries of this speech would surely overcome his adversary." The author says: Why did "al‑Mujabbirah" (the believers in compulsion) say what they said? It was because they pondered on the divine decree and measure, and it led them to the conclusion that when Allah decrees a thing it must happen inescapably. Their deliberation of this subject was correct, and so was the conclusion arrived at. Where they fell in error was in correlating that conclusion with reality; they did not understand the difference between a reality and an idea based on subjective approach; they forgot the distinction between essentiality and possibility. It is correct to say, on the basis of the divine decree and measure, that nothing happens in this world unless it turns an essential being; it is because every thing and every affair comes into being when it is decreed by Allah, according to the measure prescribed by Him; and then it cannot fail to happen, otherwise the decree of Allah would fail. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that a transient or possible thing becomes essential because of its sufficient cause. When looked at in conjunction with its sufficient cause, it would be called "essential"; but separated from that cause, it would remain as it was before ‑ a transient or possible thing. Let us look at an action of man which he does by his free will and choice. When we look at it in relation to all things that are necessary to bring it into being ‑ knowledge, will, proper tools and organs, the material, formal, efficient and final causes, and all the conditions of time and space ‑ it will become an essential being; and it is in this context that it becomes subject of the eternal divine will. In other words, it becomes an essential being when all aspects of its sufficient cause are complete. But, looked in relation to each of those aspects separately, it remains only a transient and possible thing. If it is seen vis‑a‑vis its efficient cause only, that is, in relation to the doer only, it will retain its characteristics of transience and possibility ‑ it will not become an essential being. It is now clear to see at which point the believers in "compulsion " have deviated from the right path. They thought that, inasmuch as the human action was subject to the divine will and decree, man had no power on it; he was not a free agent; he was rather a helpless tool in divine hands. But they did not take into consideration the fact that the divine will takes it into hand only when all aspects of its sufficient cause are complete, and not before that. The divine will decrees that a certain action be done by Zayd ‑ not unconditionally, but on the condition that it is done by Zayd's free will, at a certain time and a certain place. Therefore, its relation to the divine will itself demands that it should be an action of a free agent, done by his own free will and choice. Doubtlessly, that action will be called an "essential" one if seen in relation to the divine will; but at the same time and by virtue of the same divine will, it will be a possible and transient action when related to the doer, that is, the man. In other words, there are two wills ‑ the human and the divine; they do not run parallel to each other; the divine will comes after and above the human will ‑ they are in a vertical, and not a horizontal position to each other. Therefore, there is no competition or collision between the two wills. It was a short‑sightedness on part of the believers in compulsion to negate the human will in order to establish the divine one. The Mu'tazilites said that human actions are done by man's free will. But they went to the other extreme, and fell in an error no less objectionable than that of al‑Mujabbirah. They too said that if human action was subjected to the divine will man would not have any freedom of will and choice. And then they took a position diametrically opposed to that of al‑Mujabbirah, and came to the conclusion that the divine will had no relation whatsoever to the human action. Thus they had to accept another creator ‑ the man himself ‑ for human actions. In this way, they accepted dualism without knowing what they were doing. Going further they fell into traps more harmful than the belief of al‑Mujabbirah. As the Imam has said: "The poor al‑Qadariyyah, they wanted to emphasize the justice of Allah, so they removed Him from His power and authority. . . " A master, showing kindness to one of his slaves, married him to a slave‑girl of his; he bestowed on him a property, gave him a well furnished house and provided him with all the necessities of life. Then there came some people there, looked at his property, and began arguing among themselves. Someone said: "Even though the master has given this property to his slave and has made him its owner, the slave has no right in, or authority over, this property at all. Does any slave own any thing? The slave together with all his belongings belongs to the master." Another said: "No. You are wrong. The master has bestowed on this slave the right of property. Now the slave is its absolute owner, and the master has lost all his rights, and authority over this property. We may say that he has abdicated in favor of his slave." The former was the opinion of al‑Mujabbirah; the later that of the Mu'tazilites. But both were wrong. The correct view would have been to say: The master has got his status of mastership; the slave his position of servitude and bondage. The master has made the slave owner of his (i.e., master's) property. The property belongs to the master at the same time that it belongs to the slave.. There are two ownerships ‑ one over the other. This is what the Imams of Ahlu 'l‑bayt have taught us to believe, and what the reason supports. 'Abayah ibn Rib'i al‑Asadi asked 'Ali, the Leader of the faithful, the meaning of "capability". The Leader of the faithful asked a counter question: "Do you have that capability without God or with God?" When 'Abayah remained silent, he told him, "Tell me, O 'Abayah! " He said: "What should I say? O Leader of the faithful! " He said: "You should say that you have got that capability by (grace of) Allah, to Whom it belongs and not to you. If He made you its owner, it would be of His bounties, and if He took it away from you, it would be a trial from Him; and He is the Owner of what He gave into your possession, and has power over what He put under your power. . . " (al‑Ihtijaj) Its meaning may be understood from the preceding explanation. al‑Mufid reports in his Sharhu 'l‑'aqa'id: It has been narrated from Abu 'I‑Hasan that he was asked whether the actions of the servants were created by Allah. He said: "If He were their creator, He would not have disowned their liability. And He (Allah) has said: Verily, Allah is free from liability to the idolaters . . . (Q 9:3). It does not mean that Allah was not responsible for the creation of the idolaters; what Allah has disowned any responsibility of, is their idol worship and their evils." There are two aspects of a deed ‑ its actual existence, and its relation to its doer. It is only when an action is seen in relation to its doer that it is called obedience or disobedience, good or bad, virtue or sin. So far as actual existence is concerned, there is no difference between marriage and fornication. What distinguishes one from the other is the command of Allah ‑ marriage conforms with the divine law, and fornication goes against that law. Someone is killed without any reason; another is killed by a lawful authority in reprisal of a murder. A teacher punishes an orphan in order to guide him aright; an oppressor hits at the same orphan unjustly. In all these examples, the actual movements of the actions are identical. But one group is called sin because it does not conform with the divine law or goes against the common weal of the society. Allah says: Allah is the Creator of everything .... (Qur'an 39:62). Every action is a "thing" inasmuch as it exists. And the Imam has said: "Whatsoever may be called a thing is created, except Allah . ." Also, Allah says: Who made good everything that He has created. . . (Qu'an 32:7). It may be inferred that everything is good because it is created. Creation and goodness are inseparable factors. But at the same time, we see that Allah has named some actions as evil. For example, He says: Whoever brings a good deed, he shall have ten like it, and whoever brings an evil deed, he shall not be recompensed but only with the like of it . . . (Qur'an 6:160). These are obviously the actions done by man; not the factor of recompense which cannot apply to divine actions. Such a deed is called sin. It is evil because it lacks some thing; because it is a nullification of a spiritual virtue or social good. In other words, a sin is sin because it is a negation , a non‑being; otherwise it would have been good. Now, let us look at the following verses of the Qur'an:
On pondering upon these verses, it becomes clear that these misfortunes are relative evils. A man is bestowed with the bounties of Allah, like security and peace; health and wealth, and so on; then he loses one or more of these bounties. This misfortune, in relation to that man, is evil because it has nullified some existing things, that is, the bounties which he had previously enjoyed. Thus, every misfortune is created by Allah, and at that stage it is not an evil. But it is an evil when seen in relation to the man who loses an existing bounty because of it. Likewise, every sin is a negative factor, and as such, it is not to be attributed to Allah, at all; though it may be attributed to Him from another angle, inasmuch as it happens by permission of Allah. al‑Bazanti said: I told Imam ar‑Rida that some of our fellows believe in compulsion and some of them advocate the (belief of) capability. Thereupon he told me: "Write down (as I say): Allah, Blessed and High is He, has said: 'O son of Adam! By My will you have become such that you wish for yourself what you wish; and by My power you discharged the duties imposed by Me (on you); and by My bounty, you got power to disobey Me; I made you hearing, seeing (and) powerful . Whatever benefit comes to you, it is from Allah; and whatever misfortune befalls you, it is from yourself. And it is as it is because I have more right on your good deeds than you have yourself; and you are more liable to your sins than Me. And it is because I cannot be questioned concerning what I do and they shall be questioned. Thus, I have arranged for you everything that you want ....' " (Qurbu 'l‑asnad) This, or nearly the same, tradition is narrated through other chains, of the Sunnis as well as of the Shi'ahs. In short, the deeds that cannot be attributed to Allah are the sins per se. It further explains the sentence of the preceding tradition: "If he were their creator, He would not have disowned their liability . . . What Allah has disowned any responsibility of, is their idol worship and their evils . . ." Imam Abu Ja'far and Imam Abu 'Abdillah said: "Certainly, Allah is too Merciful to His creatures to compel them to sin and then to punish them for it. And Allah is too powerful for anyone to think that He would will a thing and it would not happen! " (The narrator) said: "Then they were asked: 'Is there a third position between the (positions of) compulsion and (independent) capability? They said: 'Yes, broader than (the space) between the heaven and the earth.' " (at‑Tawhid) Muhammad ibn 'Ajlan said: "I asked Imam Abu 'Abdillah whether Allah has delegated (the authority of) the affair to the servants. He said: 'Allah is too honorable to delegate (the authority) to them.' I said: 'Then has He compelled the servants in their deeds?' He said: 'Allah is too just to compel a servant on a deed and then to punish him for it.' " (ibid.) In the same book Mihzam is reported as saying. "Imam Abu 'Abdillah said: "Tell me what is that concerning which our followers (whom you have left behind) have differed among themselves.' I said: 'About the compulsion and the delegation?' He said: 'Then ask me about it.' I asked: 'Has Allah compelled the servants to (commit) sins?' He replied: 'Allah is too overpowering to do it to them.' I asked: 'Then has He delegated (the authority) to them?' He replied: 'Allah has too much power over them to do so.' I asked: 'Then what is it (i.e., the correct position)? May Allah make your affairs right for you!' " (The narrator says:) "The Imam turned his hand twice or thrice, then said: 'If I were to answer you concerning it, you would not believe.' " The author says: "Allah is too overpowering to do it to them": Compulsion means that a force majeure subdues the subject in such a way that his power of action is nullified. "Too overpowering" (or, more overpowering than that) is the predominant will of Allah ‑ He has willed that the action would emanate from the doer by his free will and choice, and this is what is actually happening in the world. The divine will has given the man freedom of will; neither the divine will negates the human will, nor the human will collides with the divine will. It is reported in at‑Tawhid that Imam as‑Sadiq said: "The Apostle of Allah said: 'Whoever thinks that Allah enjoins the evil and indecency, he tells a lie against Allah; and whoever believes that the good and bad (do happen) without the will of Allah, he removes Allah from His authority."' It is reported that al‑Hajjaj ibn Yusuf wrote to al‑Hasan al‑Basri, 'Amr ibn 'Ubayd, Wasil ibn 'Ata' and 'Amir ash‑Sha'bi, asking them to describe what they had got (and what has reached them) in respect of (divine) decree and measure. al‑Hasan al‑Basri wrote to him: "The best thing that has reached me is that which I heard the Leader of the faithful, 'Ali ibn Abi Talib saying: 'Do you think that He Who has forbidden you has (also) acted cunningly against you? Rather, your lower and higher (parts) have cunningly deceived you, and Allah is free from its liability. ' " And 'Amr ibn 'Ubayd wrote to him: "The best thing I have heard about the decree and measure is the saying of the Leader of the faithful, 'Ali ibn Abi Talib: 'If perfidy were in reality decreed, the perfidious man, if punished, would have been oppressed.' " And Wasil ibn 'Ata' wrote to him: "The best I have heard about the decree and measure is the saying of the Leader of the faithful, 'Ali ibn Abi Talib: 'Do you think that He would guide you to the path and (then) obstruct you (from moving on)?"' And ash‑Sha'bi wrote to him: "The best thing I have heard concerning the decree and measure is the word of the Leader of the faithful, 'Ali ibn Abi Talib: 'Whatever you have to seek Allah's pardon for it, it is from you; and whatever you thank Allah for it, it is from Him. ' " When their letters reached al‑Hajjaj and he studied them, he said: "Certainly they have taken it from a clear spring." (at‑Tara'if) It is narrated in the same book that someone asked Imam Ja'far ibn Muhammad as‑Sadiq about the decree. and measure, and he replied: "Whatever you may blame the servant (of Allah for it, it is from him; and whatever you cannot blame the servant (of Allah for it, it is the work of Allah Allah will say to the servant: 'Why did you disobey? Why did you transgress? Why did you drink liquor? Why did you fornicate?' This is, therefore, the work of the servant. But He will not say to him: "Why were you sick? Why were you of short stature? Why did you become white? Why were you black? '(He will not ask it) because it is the work of Allah." Imam 'Ali was asked about monotheism and justice (of Allah), and he said: "Monotheism is that you should not imagine Him; and justice is that You should not accuse Him." (Nahju 'l‑balaghah) The author says: There are numerous traditions on this subject; but those quoted above throw light on all the aspects of the topic. The above‑mentioned traditions show various special methods of argument regarding the subject matter. a) Some of them argue on the basis of legislation itself order and prohibition; punishment and reward etc. ‑ that man has freedom of will, without any compulsion or delegation of power. See, for example, the speech of the Leader of the faithful, 'Ali (as.), replying to the old man. It is similar to the argument we have inferred from the words of Allah. b) Others bring in evidence the verses of the Qur'an which cannot be reconciled with the theory of compulsion or delegation of power. For example: And Allah's is the kingdom of the heavens and the earth (Qur'an 3:189); and your Lord is not in the least unjust to the servants (Qur'an 41:46). Also, there is the verse, Say: "Surely Allah does not enjoin indecency" (Qur'an 7:28). Poser: A deed may be described as unjust or indecent if it is seen in relation to us. But when it is attributed to Allah it is not called unjust or indecent. Therefore, even if all "our" deeds were actually done by Allah, it would be perfectly right to say that He is not unjust and does not enjoin indecency. Reply: The sentence seen in the context leaves no room for such misconceptions. The complete verse is as follows: And when they commit an indecency they say: "We found our fathers doing this and Allah has enjoined it on us. Say: "Surely Allah does not enjoin indecency. Do you say against Allah what you do not know?" Look at the sentence, "and Allah has enjoined it on us". The pronoun "it" clearly refers to the indecency committed by them; and it is the same deed which is referred to in the sentence, "Surely Allah does not enjoin indecency'' Allah does not enjoin what is termed as indecency in context of human activities; it does not matter whether in other framework it is called indecency or not. c) A third type of reasoning is based on the divine attributes. Allah has given Himself many good names, and has described Himself with many sublime attributes, which cannot be squared with compulsion or delegation of power. Allah is the Subduer, the Omnipotent, the Benevolent and the Merciful. These attributes can only be believed in if one believes that everything depends on Allah in its existence, and that its defects and shortcomings cannot be attributed to Him at all. (Refer to the traditions quoted from at‑Tawhid.) d) Yet others refer to seeking the pardon of Allah as well as to the blame which society directs at the wrong‑doer. If sin were not from the man himself, there would have been no meaning in asking for divine pardon. If all our actions were done by Allah why should be we blamed for only some of them and not for the others? e) Lastly, there are the traditions which explain the words, like causing to err sealing the hearts and misleading, when they are attributed to Allah: Imam ar‑Rida said explaining the words of Allah, and He (Allah) left them in utter darkness ‑ they do not see: Allah is not described as leaving something as His creatures do. But when He knew that they would not return from disbelief and error, He held back His help and grace from them and let them alone with their choice." ('Uyunu 'l‑akhbar) The same book narrates from the same Imam in explanation of the words of Allah, Allah has set a seal upon their hearts: "It is setting a seal on the hearts of the disbelievers as a punishment of their disbelief, as Allah has said: . . . nay! Allah has set a seal upon them owing to their disbelief, so they shall not believe except a few (Qur'an 4:155)." Imam as‑Sadiq said concerning the words of Allah, Surely Allah is not ashamed to set forth any parable ... : "This divine word answers those who think that Allah makes (His) servants go astray and then punishes them for that straying ..." (Majma'u 'l‑bayan) |
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